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Note 
 
When the Invention Is an Inventor: Revitalizing 
Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude 
Unpredictable Processes 
Peter M. Kohlhepp∗ 
In the movie I, Robot, renegade androids use their artificial 
intelligence to unleash death and destruction on their human 
creators.1 Although such catastrophic consequences may be lit-
tle more than fanciful entertainment, technology capable of in-
dependent creative problem-solving does highlight some very 
real concerns. Creative thinking and invention today remain 
primarily human functions, but increasingly capable computers 
are beginning to encroach. Already, systems such as genetic al-
gorithms allow computers to autonomously generate “real 
world” inventions.2 As computers grow more powerful, they will 
take on an increasing proportion of the creative, problem-
solving work previously reserved for human engineers. 
This paradigm shift demands a reexamination of the type 
of abstract innovations that should be patent-eligible. The Pa-
tent Act defines patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101,3 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2005, 
University of Wisconsin. The author thanks Tom R. Hipkins for his valuable 
feedback and assistance in developing this topic. The author also thanks the 
board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, particularly Jenni Vainik, Jen-
ny Huang, and Elizabeth Borer, for their advice and encouragement. Finally, 
the author sends his gratitude to Alvin and Cathy Kohlhepp, his family and 
friends for their continual support. Copyright © 2008 by Peter M. Kohlhepp. 
 1. See I, ROBOT (20th Century Fox 2004). 
 2. See, e.g., JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., GENETIC PROGRAMMING III: DARWI-
NIAN INVENTION AND PROBLEM SOLVING 5 (1999) (“[G]enetic programming has 
automatically created a computer program that is competitive with a human-
produced result.”); Jonathon Keats, John Koza Has Built an Invention Ma-
chine, POPULAR SCI., May 2006, at 66, 72 (describing how a genetic algorithm 
independently and autonomously generated several different circuit designs 
that had been previously patented by human designers). 
 3. Patentable subject matter is defined as “any new and useful process, 
machine, [article of ] manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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but in practice courts have found the definition to be highly 
elastic.4 With three recent decisions, however, the Federal Cir-
cuit has given the law governing patentable subject matter new 
relevance.5 Artificial creativity provides a particularly useful 
lens through which to analyze the proper limits of this tortured 
and tangled area of jurisprudence. 
In each of the three Federal Circuit cases, the parties ar-
gued over the appropriate role of devices traditionally used to 
limit patentability under § 101. These include restricting pa-
tentable subject matter to technological arts,6 requiring that an 
abstract process be tied to a tangible machine such as a com-
puter,7 and precluding patenting of purely mental steps.8 Such 
barriers are unlikely to significantly impede the patentability 
of artificial creativity.9 And yet, by raising the potential of pa-
 
 4. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308−09 (1980) (find-
ing a live, human-made organism patentable under § 101); State St. Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373−75 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (finding a method for conducting business to be patentable under § 101); 
Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Para-
digm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (“The duration and scope of IP rights expand 
without limit.”); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 
B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1160 (1999) (“[Subject-matter doctrine] seemingly bars few, 
if any, applications for patent. After State Street, it is hardly an exaggeration 
to say that if you can name it, you can claim it.”). 
 5. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding 
business methods that “depend for their operation on human intelligence 
alone” unpatentable under § 101); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) (finding an electrical signal unpatentable under § 101); In re Bilski, 
264 F. App’x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering a hearing en banc to decide 
whether a particular business method is patentable under § 101). 
 6. Compare Appellants’ Supplemental Brief at 11–12, In re Bilski, No. 
2007-1130 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2008) (arguing that a risk-managing business 
method is part of the technological arts, and, alternatively, that the USPTO 
explicitly disclaimed a technological arts requirement as an exclusive test in 
Ex parte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1388 (Patent & Trademark Office Bd. 
of Patent Appeals & Interferences Sept. 28, 2005)), with Supplemental Brief of 
Appellee at 10, In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2008) (“[T]he 
technological focus of the Patent Act and the Patent Clause informs the outer 
limits of subject matter eligibility under section 101.”). 
 7. See In re Bilski, 264 F. App’x at 897 (requesting the parties brief the 
issue of whether a statutory “process must result in a physical transformation 
of an article or be tied to a machine”); Supplemental Brief of Appellee, supra 
note 6, at 6–14 (arguing that a statutory process that does not effect a physical 
transformation must be “tied to a particular apparatus”). 
 8. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1378 (“It is thus clear that the present 
statute does not allow patents to be issued on particular business systems . . . 
that depend entirely on the use of mental processes.”). 
 9. Inventions such as genetic algorithms are clearly part of the technolo-
gical arts, must be performed in connection with a computer, and do not “de-
 2008] PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 781 
 
tenting a process that is itself capable of producing new inven-
tion, technologies such as genetic algorithms invoke the same 
general concern these Federal Circuit cases struggle with—
potentially overbroad and innovation-chilling protection. Thus, 
an analysis of artificial creativity performs two useful func-
tions. First, it illustrates the current lack of technology-
independent, coherent, and consistent standards under § 101. 
Second, it serves as a handy proxy with which to test the ade-
quacy of proposed tools to limit patentable subject matter. 
Part I of this Note reviews the historical development and 
present state of subject-matter doctrine with particular empha-
sis on the convoluted history of software patentability. Part II 
analyzes creative algorithms as inventive processes and identi-
fies costs associated with patenting them. It then applies cur-
rent subject-matter doctrine to creative algorithms, demon-
strating the doctrine’s inadequacy. Part III posits that subject-
matter doctrine is sufficiently vital in theory to limit patent 
coverage in the face of emerging technologies such as creative 
algorithms. Rendering the doctrine effective in practice, howev-
er, requires two changes in how the doctrine is applied. First, 
courts must apply common law limits on patentability solely as 
a means to ensure that society retains free access to the basic 
tools of science. Second, courts must limit statutory patentabili-
ty under § 101 to only those inventions that produce predicta-
ble and replicable results when used. By separately analyzing 
what is patentable subject matter under § 101 and what is not 
under the common law, courts can effectively screen out those 
abstract inventions that would impermissibly chill future inno-
vation if patented. 
I.  SUBJECT-MATTER DOCTRINE AND  
ARTIFICIAL INVENTORS   
A. HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PATENT 
A patent gives an inventor the right to “exclude others 
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention” 
for a limited time.10 Theorists justify this advantage with sev-
eral distinct philosophical theories. A “natural rights” approach 
gives an inventor ownership of that with which he has “mixed 
his labour.”11 Intellectual property rights today are primarily 
 
pend entirely on the use of mental processes.” See id. at 1376–79. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1)−(2) (2000). 
 11. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Pro-
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justified with utilitarian theories.12 The rights are simply 
means to an end—they give the inventor a monopoly over his 
invention for a limited time (the incentive to create) in ex-
change for public access to and later use of the knowledge (the 
public benefit).13 
Because the incentive to create is a right to exclude, patent 
laws must limit the right to exclude to ensure the tools and re-
sources needed to create in the first place remain freely availa-
ble. At the same time, they must ensure that the right to ex-
clude is robust enough to function as a real incentive to invent. 
The Constitution charges Congress with crafting this delicate 
balance.14 Under current patent laws, an inventor must show 
that his invention is of a kind eligible for patent protection,15 
useful,16 novel,17 non-obvious,18 and adequately enabled and 
described.19 If an inventor fails to meet any one of these re-
quirements, his invention is ineligible for the patent privilege.20 
B. ADVANCING TECHNOLOGY: THE GROWTH OF SOFTWARE AND 
THE RISE OF CREATIVE ALGORITHMS 
Whether and to what extent abstract innovations such as 
computer software are patentable is important now more than 
 
metheus Books 1986) (1690); see also DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES 
OF PATENT LAW 39–41 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing an inventor’s “inherent right 
to the fruits of her labor”). 
 12. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 50 (“[T]he predominant justification 
for American intellectual property law has been . . . utilitarianism.”). 
 13. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 167 
(1989) (noting that the patent statute seeks a “careful balance between public 
right and private monopoly to promote certain creative activity”); Graham v. 
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (“The patent monopoly was not designed 
to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a 
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”). But see Maverick 
Boat Co. v. Am. Marine Holdings, Inc., 418 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that Congress passed the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1301 
(2006)), in response to Bonito Boats to provide copyright protection to the own-
ers of certain vessel hull designs). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries”). 
 15. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 16. See id. §§ 101, 112. 
 17. See id. § 102. 
 18. See id. § 103. 
 19. See id. § 112. 
 20. See id. § 101. 
 2008] PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 783 
 
ever for two reasons. First, the software industry views the 
software patent as an important business asset,21 and predic-
tability as to the viability of that asset is essential to long-term 
business success.22 Second, emerging software enabling artifi-
cial creativity directly challenges definitions of invention and 
inventor, in addition to implicating traditional qualms related 
to software’s inherent intangibility. 
1. Software Patents: Why the Surge? 
Software developers have increasingly exploited the incen-
tives and protections patent law provides.23 Indeed, the percen-
tage of all granted patents that can be counted as software pa-
tents has risen dramatically, from two percent in the early 
1980’s to almost fifteen percent in 2002.24 The growing number 
of software patents may be attributed in part to expanding 
software technology research and development activity.25 Im-
pressive growth of the software industry26 has predictably re-
sulted in an absolute increase in software innovation. Software 
giants IBM, AT&T, and Hewlett-Packard all rank in the top fif-
ty of Fortune 500 companies.27 Along with the absolute growth 
of the industry, however, has come an increasing appreciation 
for the perceived value of software patents and thus an in-
creased propensity to patent.28 A recent study attributed this 
increased propensity to patent primarily to courts’ more favor-
able view towards software patentability.29 
 
 21. See JAMES BESSEN & ROBERT M. HUNT, AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT 
SOFTWARE PATENTS 17 (2004), http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf 
(noting an increased propensity to patent software). 
 22. See Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Mat-
ter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 361 (2002) (“Ambiguous 
patent law standards can lead to excessive curtailment of activities under 
overly broad threats of patent enforcement.”); John A. Burtis, Comment, To-
wards a Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light of 
In re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1995) (noting that the market-
place makes business decisions based on the predicted protection available to 
technology). 
 23. Between 1978 and 1987, the USPTO issued 262 software patents. RO-
BERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 154 (4th ed. 2007). Currently, the number of software 
patents issued exceeds 20,000 every year. See JAMES BESSEN & ROBERT M. 
HUNT, THE SOFTWARE PATENT EXPERIMENT 1 (2004), http://www 
.researchoninnovation.org/softpat.pdf. 
 24. BESSEN & HUNT, supra note 23, at 5. 
 25. But see James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Soft-
ware Patents, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 180–83 (2007) (concluding 
that the increase in software patents is primarily the result of legal changes 
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Because software code is one of the “Writings” protected by 
the Constitution,30 it is also generally afforded copyright pro-
tection.31 The prevailing view, however, is that patents offer 
broader and more easily enforced property rights.32 Copyright 
law does not allow the holder to exclude an author who inde-
pendently creates a substantially similar work.33 Copyright law 
also permits reverse-engineering of software.34 Furthermore, 
the “fair use” doctrine allows others to reproduce the copy-
righted work for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing . . . scholarship, or research.”35 Copyrights, however, do of-
fer a much longer term of coverage than patents36 and are 
much easier to obtain.37 
 
that make the patents easier to acquire). 
 26. The total software industry research and development increased from 
“$121 billion in 1988 to $164 billion in 1998 in 1996 dollars.” BESSEN & HUNT, 
supra note 21, at 17 n.21. 
 27. Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, May 5, 2008, at F1. 
 28. See BESSEN & HUNT, supra note 21, at 16–17 (noting that the number 
of U.S. software patents granted increased at about sixteen percent per year, 
while industrial investment in software research and development grew at on-
ly 4.4 percent per year during the same period). 
 29. See Bessen & Hunt, supra note 25, at 181 (“Eliminating the subject 
matter exclusion and reducing the nonobviousness and enablement 
requirements may have made software patents much easier (less costly) to 
obtain.”). 
 30. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 35−36 
(1978) [hereinafter COPYRIGHTED WORKS REPORT]. 
 31. Computer programs are copyrightable as long as they are recorded to 
a hard drive or some other tangible medium. See COPYRIGHTED WORKS RE-
PORT, supra note 30, at 49. 
 32. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 959, 1015–16 (1986). But see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The 
Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1136 (1990) (“Many in the software 
industry believe copyright has a number of significant advantages over pa-
tents as a form of legal protection for programs.”). 
 33. Thomas Caswell & Kimberly Van Amburg, Copyright Protection on the 
Internet, in E-COPYRIGHT LAW HANDBOOK 7-1, 7-8 (Laura Lee Stapleton ed., 
Supp. 2003) (noting that someone who independently creates an exact replica 
of another copyrighted work is also entitled to a copyright over that work). 
 34. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the 
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001) (“[V]irtually every court to 
consider the issue has concluded that there is a right to reverse engineer a co-
pyrighted program for at least some purposes.”). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 36. In most cases, the copyright term is granted for the life of the author 
plus seventy years. Id. § 302(a). A patent, on the other hand, is enforceable for 
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2. Creative Algorithms: Development and Application 
Conventional computer software alone has substantially 
challenged the law governing patentable subject matter. As 
technology continues to accelerate, however, research, discov-
ery, and design work increasingly depend on computer pro-
grams to do not only the number-crunching but also the “think-
ing.”38 Emerging artificial intelligence technologies39 highlight 
the importance of building a coherent subject-matter doctrine. 
Software using artificial intelligence does not rely exclu-
sively on a linear set of programming instructions—rather, it 
has some capacity to reason for itself.40 “Expert systems” 
yielded some of the first practical applications of artificial intel-
ligence research and continue to find useful application.41 Soft-
ware incorporating “neural networks” is a more refined applica-
tion of artificial intelligence.42 Recent technologies known as 
“genetic programming” or “evolutionary engineering” have ar-
guably proven to be the most effective at replicating human 
creativity.43 By applying Charles Darwin’s principle of natural 
selection, computer programmers can write software that 
enables computers to creatively problem-solve.44 
 
only twenty years from filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
 37. The author of a written work obtains a copyright simply by creation—
no official registration is required. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
 38. See Liza Vertinsky & Todd M. Rice, Thinking About Thinking Ma-
chines: Implications of Machine Inventors for Patent Law, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 574, 581 (2002). 
 39. The increasing utility of artificial intelligence technologies is enabled 
in large part by increases in computer hardware processing power. See id. at 
578 (noting that computer processing power has doubled every eighteen 
months for the past thirty years). 
 40. See id. at 576 (noting that new “thinking machines” reason by auto-
mating the trial and error learning process). 
 41. See Todd Shuster, Originality in Computer Programs and Expert Sys-
tems: Discerning the Limits of Protection Under Copyright Laws of France and 
the United States, 5 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1, 76 (1992). 
 42. See Dana S. Rao, Note, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Every-
where—An Examination of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neur-
al Networks in Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & 
ECON. 509, 509 (1997) (explaining that a neural network can generalize infor-
mation to solve novel problems beyond the scope of the network’s original 
training). 
 43. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 2, at 5–7 (describing cases where artificial 
intelligence has produced inventions that rival those of humans). 
 44. Id. at 3. 
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Initially, a set of subprograms are randomly generated 
with the object of solving a particular problem.45 Each sub-
program attempts to solve the problem and is assigned a score 
based on how well it performed.46 Those subprograms with the 
best scores are copied into a new population to be the “parents” 
of the next generation.47 Simulated sexual reproduction creates 
the next generation of subprograms by randomly combining 
chosen features from two parents.48 The process is repeated 
through a specified set of iterations, and the subprogram with 
the highest score is the optimal design or solution.49 No one can 
predict the route to the optimal solution or the solution itself 
because the process incorporates random mutation.50 
Whether creative software should be patentable is no long-
er simply an academic exercise—the Patent Office has already 
granted several patents claiming precisely these genetic pro-
gramming algorithms.51 John Koza, one of the pioneers of ge-
netic programming technology, has patented not only genetic 
programming processes, but also designs produced by genetic 
programming.52 Genetic programming has moved beyond la-
boratories, however. General Electric has used genetic algo-
rithms to aid in the design of jet engines.53 Engineers in Wis-
consin are using genetic algorithms to optimize efficiency and 
minimize emissions for diesel engines.54 Virginia engineers de-
signed a novel and effective satellite communications anten-
na.55 Furthermore, programs utilizing genetic programming are 
 
 45. Id. at 19–23. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 22. This design is often called the “best-so-far individual.” Id. 
 50. Id. at 76 (“The genetic operation of mutation randomly alters one or 
more genes at particular locations along a preestablished fixed-size [algorith-
mic program].”). 
 51. See, e.g., Method and Apparatus for Automatic Synthesis, Placement 
and Routing of Complex Structures, U.S. Patent No. 6,424,959 (filed June 17, 
1999); Method and Apparatus for Automated Design of Complex Structures 
Using Genetic Programming, U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 (filed Jan. 5, 1999). 
 52. See Keats, supra note 2, at 72 (noting that on January 25, 2005, the 
USPTO granted a patent for a circuit designed by a genetic programming al-
gorithm); see also Apparatus for Improved General-Purpose PID and Non-PID 
Controllers, U.S. Patent No. 6,847,851 (filed July 12, 2002). 
 53. See Ray Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME, Dec. 4, 2000, at 
65. 
 54. See Diesel Breeding: Looking Into Engines Helps Cross the Best with 
the Best, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Sept. 2002, at 53. 
 55. See Anne Eisenberg, When a Gizmo Can Invent a Gizmo, N.Y. TIMES, 
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increasingly available in commercialized forms.56 Although this 
technology remains far from ubiquitous,57 it is emblematic of 
the kinds of challenges highly abstract inventions will present 
to the U.S. patent system in the coming years. These chal-
lenges, this Note argues, are most effectively met through ap-
plication of § 101. 
C. SUBJECT MATTER PATENTABILITY DOCTRINE: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 
In § 101 of the Patent Act, Congress explicitly defined sub-
ject matter eligible for patent protection as any “process, ma-
chine, [article of] manufacture, or composition of matter.”58 The 
precise definition of a patentable “process” remains somewhat 
uncertain.59 The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted 
the four statutory categories broadly—they encompass “any-
thing under the sun that is made by man.”60 This generous in-
terpretation, combined with subsequent court decisions consis-
tently expanding the scope of patentable subject matter,61 led 
some to conclude that the four statutory categories are “merely 
 
Nov. 25, 1999, at G9. 
 56. See Gary H. Anthes, Self-taught, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 6, 2006, at 
28; Peter Coffee, ‘Exotic’ Tools Go Mainstream, EWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at D1 
(discussing the development of programs such as Discipulus, a genetic pro-
gramming engine, and NeuralTools, a program utilizing neural network soft-
ware). 
 57. John Koza, one of the pioneers of the genetic engineering technology, 
noted that “sometime [within] 10 years we ought to be able to play in the do-
main of real engineers.” Anthes, supra note 56, at 28. 
 58. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). The present language is derived almost verba-
tim from the first Patent Act of 1793, with the only change being the substitu-
tion of the word “process” for the word “art.” See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980). 
 59. The Supreme Court defined a “process” as “‘an act, or a series of acts, 
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a differ-
ent state or thing.’” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (quoting 
Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)). Actual physical transforma-
tion, however, “is not an invariable requirement.” AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 60. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952)); 
see also Sabrina Safrin, Chain Reaction: How Property Begets Property, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1917, 1919 (2007) (“Over the last several decades, know-
ledge, in particular, has undergone increased propertization . . . .”). 
 61. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981) (finding computer 
programs to be patentable subject matter); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Sig-
nature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding business 
methods to be patentable subject matter). 
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representative.”62 Indeed, between 1995 and 2006, the Federal 
Circuit did not hold a single patent claim unpatentable under 
§ 101.63 
Not content to define what can be patented, the Supreme 
Court gradually carved out “[t]he laws of nature, physical phe-
nomena, and abstract ideas” as distinctly unpatentable subject 
matter under the common law.64 Courts consistently cite the 
need to keep the basic tools of scientific research available to all 
as the primary justification for these exclusionary categories.65 
Some commentators understand these categories to merely re-
flect a preference for applied research—a judicial gloss meant 
to force inventors to focus on solving real-world problems.66 
Still others understand the categories to be particular expres-
sions of other patent law doctrines, rather than independent 
limits. Natural phenomena and laws of nature are “inherently” 
present in nature and thus nonnovel,67 while abstract ideas are 
ephemeral and thus incapable of being adequately disclosed.68 
 
 62. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 773. The Federal Circuit expressly 
stated that “the question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject 
matter should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a 
claim is directed to . . . but rather on the essential characteristics of the sub-
ject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. 
 63. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 23, at 153–54. 
 64. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309; see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (holding claims unpatentable because 
the qualities claimed were “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men 
and reserved exclusively to none”); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61, 116 
(1854) (finding Morse’s claim for using electromagnetism to transfer intelligi-
ble signals directed at nonpatentable subject matter because “the discovery of 
a principle in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable”). 
 65. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (“Phenomena of na-
ture, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual con-
cepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technolo-
gical work.”); Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130 (“The qualities of these bacteria, like 
the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the store-
house of knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free 
to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”); see also Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, 
Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable 
Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology Research Tools, 
19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 79, 101 (2005). 
 66. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1642−43 (2003). 
 67. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
371, 408 (2005); see also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978) (“The 
underlying notion is that a scientific principle, such as that expressed in res-
pondent’s algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always existed.”). 
 68. Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public 
Domain, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 519, 546 (2006). 
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The development of software code capable of running on 
general purpose computers only added to the judiciary’s strug-
gle to articulate a consistent approach. Software is distin-
guished from computer hardware in that it is essentially a set 
of instructions contained in a sequence of codes.69 These in-
structions tell the physical hardware comprising the computer 
what to do, and the program runs as the computer follows its 
instructions.70 For many years, the mathematical algorithm ex-
ception precluded the patenting of pure software code,71 pri-
marily because courts regarded algorithms as unpatentable 
“laws of nature”72 or “abstract ideas.”73 
With a 5-4 decision in 1981, however, the Court began to 
blaze a theoretical path for those seeking to patent software-
based inventions.74 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist 
found a process for curing rubber that incorporated a known 
mathematical formula called the Arrhenius equation to be pa-
tentable subject matter.75 An otherwise patentable process,76 he 
reasoned, was not unpatentable merely because it used a ma-
thematical formula or algorithm.77 Patent protection for a “for-
mula in the abstract,” however, remained unavailable under 
 
 69. See WILLIAM STALLINGS, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION & ARCHITECTURE: 
DESIGNING FOR PERFORMANCE 57 (7th ed. 2006) (“[I]nstead of rewiring the 
hardware for each new program, the programmer merely needs to supply a 
new set of control signals.”). 
 70. Id. (“Each code is, in effect, an instruction, and part of the hardware 
interprets each instruction and generates control signals.”). 
 71. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 23, at 131; Burtis, supra note 22, at 
1157 (discussing the difficulty of classifying the mathematical algorithms 
integral to computer software as either “inventions” or “abstract ideas” be-
cause they “may be used to describe both discovered and invented subject mat-
ter”). 
 72. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 593−94 (defining the claimed mathemati-
cal algorithm as a law of nature). 
 73. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (“It is conceded 
that one may not patent an idea. But in practical effect that would be the re-
sult if the formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were 
patented in this case.” (emphasis added)). 
 74. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981) (holding that the in-
clusion of a mathematical formula or algorithm in an otherwise patentable in-
vention does not render the invention unpatentable). 
 75. Id. at 191−92. 
 76. A patentable process is one that “transform[s] or reduc[es] an article 
to a different state or thing.” Id. at 192. 
 77. Id. The Court foreshadowed this reasoning three years earlier, stating 
that “a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature 
or a mathematical algorithm.” Flook, 437 U.S. at 590. 
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§ 101.78 The Federal Circuit (drawing from the work of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals) synthesized this reason-
ing into the formal Freeman-Walter-Abele test.79 This test sepa-
rated claims consisting wholly of unapplied mathematical algo-
rithms from those containing algorithms in conjunction with 
otherwise statutory subject matter.80 
Taking its cue from the Supreme Court, the Federal Cir-
cuit continued to expand the outer limits of subject matter ju-
risdiction. In re Alappat confirmed what two earlier Federal 
Circuit cases implied81—that a software program could be pa-
tented when characterized as a § 101 machine.82 In effect, In re 
Alappat rendered any software program patentable, so long the 
inventor claimed the program in conjunction with a computer 
capable of running it.83 
In 1998, the Federal Circuit further diminished subject 
matter patentability as a meaningful obstacle to software pa-
tentability. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial Group, Inc. suggested, and a later case confirmed,84 that 
patent applicants no longer needed to follow the formality of 
claiming software as a machine—any process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter that “produce[d] a ‘useful, 
 
 78. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. Even claims limiting application of a formula 
to a particular technology remained unpatentable, as did those that merely 
added insignificant post-solution activity to an algorithm. Id. at 192−93. 
 79. See Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 
1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The fact 
that [the machine] operates according to an algorithm does not make it non-
statutory.”); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[I]f a ma-
chine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is physically dif-
ferent from the machine without that program.”). 
 82. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (1994) (holding that repro-
gramming a general-purpose computer creates a new “machine” under § 101). 
The disputed claims covered a “rasterizer”—essentially a circuit board pro-
grammed to normalize data displayed on an oscilloscope screen, allowing the 
oscilloscope to display a smooth data curve line. See id. at 1537−39. 
 83. Id. at 1545 (“[A] general purpose computer in effect becomes a special 
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions pur-
suant to instruction from program software. . . . In any case, a computer, like a 
rasterizer, is [sic] apparatus not mathematics.”). 
 84. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358−59 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (finding a process using a mathematical algorithm to automate dif-
ferential billing of long-distance calls to be useful and therefore statutory sub-
ject matter). The scope of § 101 is “the same regardless of the form—machine 
or process—in which a particular claim is drafted.” Id. at 1357. 
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concrete, and tangible result’” was patentable.85 Furthermore, 
State Street explicitly disclaimed the Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test.86 Any software invention that accomplished a useful result 
was now patentable.87 
D. REVERSING THE TREND: RECENT CASE LAW REVITALIZES 
§ 101 
Despite the apparent breadth of § 101,88 there are definite 
signs its scope may be narrowing. In re Nuijten found that a 
signal containing an improved digital watermark for audio files 
did not fall into any of the four categories and was therefore 
unpatentable.89 Nuijten forcefully reasserted the independence 
of the subject matter test, narrowing State Street by holding a 
claim covering material outside the four categories unpatenta-
ble “even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful.”90 
Simply put, “[t]he four categories together describe the exclu-
sive reach of patentable subject matter.”91 Although In re Com-
iskey echoed this theme,92 the decision’s real significance lay in 
its broader implications. First, the court restated the necessity 
of a first-in-time subject-matter test.93 Second, the court again 
emphasized the four § 101 categories as real limits on patenta-
bility.94 Third, the court affirmed common law limits on patent-
 
 85. Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544). 
 86. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 87. See id. at 1373 (“Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifia-
ble by showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied con-
cepts or truths that are not ‘useful.’”). 
 88. See CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 775 (noting that courts have ex-
tended patentable subject matter to cover virtually all controversial subject 
matter they have confronted, including living organisms, computer programs, 
and business methods). 
 89. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 90. Id. at 1354. 
 91. Id. (emphasis added). 
 92. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding 
claims unpatentable because “mental processes . . . standing alone are not pa-
tentable even if they have a practical application” (emphasis added)). 
 93. See id. at 1371 (“It is well established that ‘[t]he first door which must 
be opened on the difficult path to patentability is § 101.’” (quoting State St. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998))). 
 94. Two claims relating to “a method and system for mandatory arbitra-
tion involving legal documents, such as wills or contracts” recite unpatentable 
“mental steps” because they fail to “describe a process of manufacture or a 
process for the alteration of a composition of matter.” In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 
at 1379. 
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able subject matter—claims “directed to an abstract idea itself” 
are simply unpatentable.95 Both of these decisions came on the 
heels of Supreme Court proceedings in which dissenting justic-
es pointedly questioned the Federal Circuit’s liberal application 
of § 101.96 Furthermore, the five questions to be addressed by 
the Federal Circuit when it decides the pending case In re Bils-
ki suggest that characterization of the four statutory categories 
as “merely representative” may have been premature.97 
Faced with explosive growth in computer software, courts 
initially struggled to apply old doctrines of subject matter pa-
tentability to a new, less tangible form of technology. The dust 
momentarily settled, leaving software effectively patentable as 
long as it accomplished a useful result. Now, continuing tech-
nological innovation is forcing courts to once again reconsider 
the proper role of § 101. Indeed, commentators predict that the 
Supreme Court will revisit the proper scope of § 101 soon.98 
II.  ARTIFICIAL CREATIVITY EXPOSES PATENT LAW’S 
COSTLY IMPOTENCE  
Emerging technologies such as genetic algorithms can be 
classified as both inventions and inventors. If the patent sys-
tem is to remain viable, unpredictable abstract inventions such 
as artificial creative processes must be unpatentable. Of the pa-
tent law doctrines, subject matter patentability is best 
equipped to maintain the necessarily sharp distinction between 
 
 95. Id. at 1379−81. 
 96. The Court heard oral arguments for Laboratory Corp. of America 
Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. in 2006. See 546 U.S. 975 (2005) 
(granting petition for writ of certiorari). Justice Breyer dissented from the 
Court’s subsequent dismissal of the writ as improvidently granted, noting that 
“[Federal Circuit precedent] does say that a process is patentable if it produces 
a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible result.’ But this Court has never made such a 
statement and, if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where 
this Court has held the contrary.” Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite 
Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing State St., 
149 F.3d at 1373). 
 97. See In re Bilski, 264 F. App’x. 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (ordering an en 
banc rehearing asking, among other questions, what standard governs a sta-
tutory “process” under § 101). 
 98. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, In Search of the Undiscovered Country: 
The Challenge of Describing Patentable Subject Matter, 23 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 395, 400 (2007); Sue Ann Mota, What Is Patentable 
Subject Matter? The Supreme Court Dismissed LabCorp v. Metabolite Labora-
tories, But the Issue Is Not Going Away, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 181, 
185−92 (2007) (reviewing court decisions rendered during the LabCorp litiga-
tion). 
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inventor and invention. As currently applied, however, it is 
woefully inadequate. 
A. CREATIVE SOFTWARE: PROPERLY UNPATENTABLE 
What characterizes an “inventive process”? Simply put, an 
inventive process is anything that results in invention.99 A 
technician employs pure logical reasoning,100 whether per-
formed mentally or with the aid of a computer program, to ar-
rive at a useful but likely nonnovel or obvious solution. An art-
ist, on the other hand, taps pure creativity to generate new 
ideas but lacks the logic necessary to determine which are use-
ful. True invention occurs only when an inventor combines 
creativity with logic to obtain a solution that is useful, new, and 
not easily predictable.101 
That is precisely what creative algorithms do. Take, for ex-
ample, an electronic circuit. Traditionally, a human engineer 
must order various capacitors, inductors, and transistors into a 
specific circuit design. Then, a conventional software algorithm 
can enable an industrial assembly line robot to repeatedly as-
semble this specific circuit. John Koza’s patented genetic algo-
rithm, on the other hand, allows a software algorithm to actual-
ly design the circuit, rather than merely replicate it.102 A 
genetic algorithm replaces the electrical engineer, autonomous-
ly choosing, ordering, and assigning strengths to various circuit 
components to achieve the predetermined circuit performance 
parameters.103 Creative algorithms, like the mind, have the dis-
tinctly creative capacity to autonomously generate solutions 
that are both useful and unique.104 
From the analysis above, it is clear that patents claiming 
algorithms capable of creative problem-solving effectively read 
 
 99. Cf. Vernon W. Ruttan, Usher and Schumpeter on Invention, Innova-
tion, and Technological Change, 73 Q.J. ECON. 596, 600 (1959) (defining the 
act of inventing generally as any process requiring “an ‘act of insight’ going 
beyond the normal exercise of technical or professional skill”). 
 100. Logical reasoning can be defined as “drawing inferences (conclusions) 
from some initial information (premises).” Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing 
Thought, 60 SMU L. REV. 317, 335 (2007). 
 101. “[A]t the end of the day, logical thinking is insufficient for invention 
and creativity.” KOZA ET AL., supra note 2, at 11; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Te-
leflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (“If a person of ordinary skill can im-
plement a predictable variation [of a prior invention or group of prior inven-
tions], [obviousness under § 103] likely bars its patentability.”). 
 102. See U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 (filed Jan. 5, 1999). 
 103. See id. col. 52. 
 104. See Vertinsky & Rice, supra note 38, at 601. 
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on inventive processes. But what is wrong with such claims? 
Rationale supporting software patentability in general also ap-
plies to creative algorithms. Some argue that because the Fra-
mers created the patent system to protect the most valuable as-
sets, patents should cover any invention that is economically 
valuable.105 Furthermore, a technology-driven shift from tangi-
ble to intangible inventions has left intangible inventions with 
a social value at least as high as traditionally protected tangi-
ble inventions.106 Finally, even if patentability should be li-
mited to the technical arts, creative algorithms are certainly 
more technical in nature than business methods or medical 
procedures, both of which are currently patentable.107 
Creative algorithms, however, involve an additional step—
they blur the formerly bright line between the invention and 
the creative process that produced it.108 Intuitively, it seems 
that a process emulating human creativity and intelligence 
simply should not be private property.109 Unlike a heart, lung, 
or even a living cell, human creativity is not easily reduced to a 
biological mechanism. A creative algorithm seems to imitate 
human consciousness rather than biology. Acquiring private 
property rights in something so unique to and so universal 
among humans must give pause. 
 
 105. Erik S. Maurer, Note, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpre-
tation of Patentable Subject Matter, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2001) 
(“[The] wealth-generating characteristics of innovation fundamentally justify a 
broad interpretation of patentable subject matter.”). 
 106. See Gruner, supra note 22, at 359−60 (arguing for new patentable sub-
ject matter standards to accommodate intangible information processing ad-
vances that are “more and more the central features of new designs for prod-
ucts and processes that are highly useful”). 
 107. See Thomas, supra note 4, at 1142 (arguing that patentable subject 
matter should be limited to “technology” because “technology presents a form 
of rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency and capable 
of being assessed through objective criteria”). 
 108. Before programmers developed creative algorithms, there was little 
risk of propertizing the inventive process because pure “mental steps” cannot 
be patented. See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377−78 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“[M]ental processes—or processes of human thinking—standing alone are not 
patentable even if they have practical application.”). 
 109. Similar intuitive objections have been raised to DNA sequence patents 
and patents covering biological life forms. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron 
Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Re-
conceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 435 (2002) 
(discussing fears that granting private property rights in naturally occurring 
human DNA sequences, tissues, or biochemicals is akin to slavery, in that it 
prevents other individuals from commercializing such substances naturally 
existing in their own bodies). 
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The prospect of patenting artificial creativity also raises 
substantial practical concerns—indeed, practical concerns suf-
ficient to obviate reliance on moral intuition. Extending patent 
protection to creative processes is inconsistent with basic pa-
tent law philosophy, renders patent scope ambiguous and in-
fringing activity difficult to detect, and threatens to chill future 
invention. 
Patent protection for any invention ultimately must com-
port with basic philosophies underlying the patent system. The 
American patent system is based primarily on utilitarianism110 
and secondarily on John Locke’s theory of labor.111 The inhe-
rently broad scope of a patent covering an inventive process 
renders its patentability suspect under Locke’s labor theory. By 
exploiting an automated inventive process to solve a wide va-
riety of problems, the inventor could gain an economic reward 
out of proportion to the amount of labor he invested in creating 
his inventive process. Under traditional utilitarian theory, 
granting patent protection would certainly serve both as a sti-
mulus for further development of creative algorithms and as a 
mechanism for forcing their public disclosure. Patent protec-
tion, however, is not the only way to achieve these ends.112 Oth-
er forms of intellectual property protection, such as copyright 
and trade secret, remain available to creative software. Fur-
thermore, because of the tremendous commercial potential of 
artificial creative processes, the competitive advantage from be-
ing the first mover may alone be sufficient incentive.113 Public 
disclosure, on the other hand, might be achieved in the same 
manner as basic scientific research—through publication in 
trade journals.114 
 
 110. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellec-
tual History, 1550−1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1315 (2001) (contending that 
Locke’s labor theory of property contributed significantly to the growth and 
development of patent law). 
 112. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 32, at 1148 (“[I]nnovation in the software 
field has developed rapidly without the aid of patents.”). 
 113. While the average amount of time that a first mover enjoys an effec-
tive monopoly has steadily declined, it remains significant, and the absolute 
size of sales per unit time of the effective monopoly is increasing. See Rajshree 
Agarwal & Michael Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of Competitive 
Entry, 1887−1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161, 173 (2001). 
 114. See Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Proper-
ty Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 79−80 (1999) (pro-
posing to stimulate invention “not through stronger intellectual property 
rights, but through norms that militate against the securing of such rights”); 
see also ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 273−75 (1973) (de-
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Artificial inventors present related practical difficulties in 
determining patent scope and enforcing infringement. Does a 
patented inventive process or machine inventor cover only the 
process, or does it also cover the products?115 In either case, en-
forcing the right to exclude becomes an exercise in futility. 
Suppose, for example, Designer A, the holder of a patented ge-
netic algorithm capable of designing circuits,116 brought an in-
fringement action against Designer B. He alleges that Designer 
B used his patented process for inventing circuits. Because of 
the unpredictable nature of genetic algorithm function, it would 
be effectively impossible to prove that Designer B’s circuit re-
sulted from use of Designer A’s inventive process. Even if De-
signer A could prove that Designer B used the patented inven-
tive process to design circuits generally, because genetic 
algorithms do not produce the same result twice he would find 
it difficult to prove that Designer B used his program to design 
this circuit. 
Finally, there is a strong risk that granting monopoly 
rights over such “broad areas of problem solving” will chill fu-
ture invention.117 The tools of science used to invent exist on a 
continuum, from basic “upstream knowledge” such as the rela-
tionship between force and mass to downstream applied know-
ledge in the form of an invention such as the microscope.118 To 
achieve the proper balance between enabling and stimulating 
invention, patent law must limit the scope of patentable subject 
matter to downstream research tools.119 The idea-expression di-
 
monstrating a robust communalism among the scientific community that en-
courages the sharing of research results). 
 115. See Vertinsky & Rice, supra note 38, at 601 (making this distinction 
between the process of artificial invention and the products of the process). 
 116. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 abstract (filed Jan. 5, 1999) (de-
scribing “[a]n automated design process and apparatus for use in designing 
complex structures, such as circuits, to satisfy prespecified design goals, using 
genetic operations”). 
 117. See Vertinsky & Rice, supra note 38, at 601. 
 118. See Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in Bio-
medical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 663 n.10 (2004) (defining basic research as 
“upstream research aimed at elucidating the fundamental structure and prop-
erties of natural phenomena,” and applied research as “downstream testing 
and experimental work that applies basic knowledge to solve practical prob-
lems”). 
 119. Limiting the control an inventor has over the “derivative works” 
enables “subsequent innovators to work out new implementations.” Burk & 
Lemley, supra note 66, at 1642−43; see also Rai, supra note 114, at 80 
(“[T]hose scientific research norms that have been most resistant to [broa-
dened intellectual property rights] are more likely to achieve creation, disclo-
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chotomy present in copyright law illustrates the necessity of 
maintaining fundamental knowledge in the public domain. Just 
as one cannot copyright specific words of the English language 
because those words are necessary to allow others to create ex-
pressive works, one should not be able to patent creative 
processes that are essential to continued invention.120 
Problem-solving creative algorithms are inherently broad 
upstream tools. Even patent claims limited to a specific appli-
cation may be couched in sufficiently expansive language to 
nonetheless cover all possible uses of a certain inventive 
process.121 Because of their ability to quickly and cheaply create 
useful downstream products, inventive processes will be re-
sponsible for an increasing percentage of society’s inventions.122 
Future inventors would be forced to clear not only the results of 
their invention against prior art, but also their problem-solving 
methods. 
Such broad patent coverage also evokes the “tragedy of the 
anticommons,” a theory recognizing the potential for broad ex-
clusionary rights to generate detrimental underuse of a re-
source (here, creative processes).123 Allowing the privatization 
of artificial inventive processes124 may give rise to a paralyzing 
anticommons where the transaction costs of licensing artificial 
inventive processes deter others from using them.125 The up-
stream nature of inventive processes only exacerbates the risk 
of an anticommons by widening the scope of invention that pa-
tent owners may exclude. 
 
sure, and development than full-blown intellectual property rights.”); Yun-
hyoung Lee, supra note 65, at 82 (contending that patents on basic scientific 
tools “disrupt the balance between freely available basic knowledge and priva-
tized applied knowledge that is crucial to driving innovation”). 
 120. See Yun-hyoung Lee, supra note 65, at 99−100. 
 121. For instance, the phrase “creating a structural design that satisfies 
prespecified design goals” may suggest the claim is limited to a specific appli-
cation, but it is unlikely that genetic algorithms have any applications other 
than creating designs that satisfy prespecified design goals. See U.S. Patent 
No. 6,360,191 claim 1 (filed Jan. 5, 1999). 
 122. See Vertinsky & Rice, supra note 38, at 578−81 (outlining the econom-
ic advantages of artificial inventors). 
 123. See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in 
the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623−24 (1998). 
 124. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 (filed Jan. 5, 1999) (granting a pri-
vate exclusionary right to inventor John Koza covering a genetic algorithm by 
claiming the algorithm as computer software). 
 125. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innova-
tion? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998). 
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This is not to say that artificial creative processes lack so-
cial value. They have tremendous potential to significantly de-
crease the cost and increase the volume of invention, resulting 
in increased economic efficiency.126 Furthermore, artificial in-
ventors eliminate human fatigue and human error from the in-
ventive process while retaining human-like creativity.127 The 
above analysis shows, however, that the costs of patenting such 
processes are high. In the absence of evidence that patent pro-
tection is necessary to stimulate development of creative algo-
rithm technology,128 the heavy cost of allowing monopolization 
of an inventive process outweighs any benefit to be gained. 
B. CURRENT SUBJECT-MATTER DOCTRINE: NEEDED BUT WEAK 
The prospect of artificial creativity confronts the patent re-
gime with fundamental challenges. Several commentators con-
tend that trying to limit patent scope through § 101 leads to 
arbitrary boundaries easily circumvented with “magic words” 
in the claim language.129 The scope of patents, they argue, can 
be adequately and more effectively limited using other doc-
trines such as novelty, nonobviousness, and the disclosure re-
quirements of § 112.130 Each of the required elements of paten-
tability (utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and adequate 
disclosure), however, is inherently individual.131 As such, these 
doctrines permit analysis of inventions claiming inventive 
processes only on a case-by-case basis. The doctrine of patenta-
ble subject matter, on the other hand, acts as patent law’s ga-
tekeeper132 and directly addresses the type of inventions eligi-
 
 126. See Vertinsky & Rice, supra note 38, at 578−79. 
 127. See id. at 578. 
 128. Two factors combine to predict rapid development of creative algo-
rithm technology in the absence of patent protection. First, conventional soft-
ware developed rapidly even before courts were willing to grant it patent pro-
tection. Second, autonomous artificial invention offers design firms who 
develop the technology potentially enormous cost savings in research and de-
velopment. 
 129. E.g., Cohen & Lemley, supra note 34, at 9 (noting that throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s, when software itself was unpatentable, inventors could 
easily circumvent this barrier by claiming software inventions as the hard-
ware “machines” they controlled). 
 130. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject 
Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1091−92 (2007); Brief of Amicus Curiae Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Law Association, in Support of Appellants for Hear-
ing En Banc at 10−13, In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 6, 2008). 
 131. See MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 180 
(2006). 
 132. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The obligation to de-
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ble for patent protection.133 Subject-matter doctrine is therefore 
better suited to categorically address the broader issues raised 
by highly abstract inventions. 
1. A Robust Patentable Subject-Matter Doctrine: Necessary 
Now More than Ever 
Although major battles over patentable subject matter may 
appear over,134 § 101 continues to perform two necessary func-
tions—first, checking the volume of patent applications, and 
second, excluding subject matter that society has determined 
too costly to protect. 
As technological development accelerates, the volume of 
invention will continue to increase proportionately. Indeed, 
over the last ten years the number of utility patents granted 
per year has increased almost 50%.135 The number of patent 
applications grew even more rapidly—increasing 60% from 
1986 to 1996136 and 120% from 1996 to 2006.137 A well-defined 
and strictly enforced subject-matter doctrine would increase 
patent examiner efficiency by allowing quick rejections for ap-
plications claiming clearly unpatentable subject matter. It 
would also decrease the number of patent applications filed in 
 
termine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must precede the de-
termination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”); see also In 
re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 
960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The first door which must be opened on the difficult path 
to patentability is § 101 . . . .”). 
 133. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 11, at 772. 
 134. Although software and biotechnology-based inventions were originally 
considered to be at least on the fringe of patentable subject matter, if not 
beyond the realm thereof, two cases appear to have placed them securely with-
in patentable subject matter. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980) (finding genetically engineered microorganisms to be patentable subject 
matter); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (implying that software programs claimed as processes 
alone are patentable subject matter); see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 34, 
at 4 (“With some eighty thousand software patents already issued, the Federal 
Circuit endorsing patentability without qualification, and the Supreme Court 
assiduously avoiding the question, software patentability [under § 101] is a 
matter for the history books.”). 
 135. The USPTO granted 61,104 patents in 1996 and 89,823 patents in 
2006. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT A1-1 
(2008), http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/all_tech.pdf. 
 136. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, NUMBER OF UTILITY PATENT AP-
PLICATIONS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN CALENDAR 
YEAR 1965 TO PRESENT (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/appl_yr.pdf. 
 137. The USPTO received 195,187 patent applications in 1996 compared 
with 425,967 in 2006. Id. 
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the first place by giving inventors in certain fields ex ante 
knowledge that their inventions are unpatentable. Society 
would thus benefit by averting (presumably) wasteful and un-
productive investment in efforts to obtain patent protection. 
Subject-matter doctrine also enables society to impose tar-
geted checks on the growth of intellectual property rights.138 
Congress has acted, albeit infrequently, to render patents on 
particularly objectionable types of invention unenforceable and, 
therefore, effectively unpatentable.139 A strong subject-matter 
doctrine also offers a psychological advantage. To some re-
searchers and inventors, economic incentives may be secondary 
to the pursuit of personal achievement and recognition.140 In-
voking the subject matter patentability doctrine allows society 
to avoid the cost of private monopolies on certain inventions 
without denying or degrading their utility. The researcher or 
inventor thus retains the psychological reward of social recog-
nition for his useful and innovative, though unpatentable, in-
vention or discovery.141 
2. Current Subject-Matter Doctrine: Almost Anything Goes 
State Street reiterates the common theme that a patentable 
invention must have a “practical application.”142 However, it 
defines practical application in a manner that bends analytical 
focus from the nature of the subject matter sought to be pa-
tented towards its result.143 Indeed, under State Street, the sub-
 
 138. If, for instance, society were to come to a consensus that genetic se-
quences should not be private property, a heightened utility requirement 
would likely be insufficient to exclude all genetic sequence patents. A much 
more effective route would be for Congress to exercise its constitutional discre-
tion to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8, by using targeted legislation to simply prohibit the patenting of ge-
netic sequences. 
 139. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000) (limiting enforcement of medical pro-
cedure patents against doctors and other health providers); see also MERGES & 
DUFFY, supra note 23, at 184−85. 
 140. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science 
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 183 (1987) (“The scientific com-
munity rewards those who make original contributions to the common stock of 
knowledge by giving them professional recognition.”). 
 141. See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The 
Case of Scientific Research, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 145, 150 (1996). 
 142. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 143. See id. (noting that claimed subject matter “constitutes a practical ap-
plication of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it pro-
duces ‘a useful, concrete and tangible result’” (emphasis added)). 
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ject matter test is virtually indistinguishable from the separate 
utility test.144 
a. Creative Algorithms Are Patentable Under the Common 
Law 
Under State Street, the common law categories have little 
independent force—any abstract idea that accomplishes a “use-
ful, concrete, and tangible result” is patentable.145 Further-
more, the result accomplished need not be “concrete and tangi-
ble” in the physical sense—the “transformation of data . . . 
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share 
price” is sufficient.146 An abstract idea is no longer per se unpa-
tentable—it is unpatentable only when it also fails to accom-
plish a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”147 With the judi-
cial test so constructed, the common law categories are only of 
minor relevance to creative algorithms. Certainly a genetic al-
gorithm that designs a working circuit achieves a “useful, con-
crete, and tangible result.” Moreover, the utility standard un-
der patent law is a “minimal one.”148 Under current patent law, 
common law categories of unpatentable subject matter have 
lost much substantive force. Either they must be given new life 
or limits on the patentability of creative algorithms must be 
found elsewhere. 
 
 144. See id. (“Unpatentable mathematical algorithms are identifiable by 
showing they are merely abstract ideas constituting disembodied concepts or 
truths that are not ‘useful.’”); see also Thomas, supra note 4, at 1160 (noting 
that State Street “collapses the subject matter inquiry into another patentabil-
ity requisite, that of utility”). 
 145. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1373. 
 146. Id.; see also AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The notion of ‘physical transformation’ can be misunders-
tood. . . . [I]t is not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how 
a mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application.”). 
 147. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1361 (noting the proper focus of inquiry 
is “whether the algorithm-containing invention, as a whole, produces a tangi-
ble, useful, result”). In re Comiskey qualifies this statement, stating that 
“mental processes . . . standing alone are not patentable even if they have 
practical application.” 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). However, other 
abstract processes with practical applications—mathematical algorithms, for 
example—likely remain patentable under State Street’s logic. 
 148. Thomas, supra note 4, at 1160. 
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b. Creative Algorithms Are “Processes” or “Machines” Under 
§ 101 
State Street’s present effect on § 101 categories is less clear. 
State Street pays them lip service,149 but quickly sidelines any 
substantive analysis in favor of a utility inquiry.150 Apparently 
regretting its broad language in State Street, however, the Fed-
eral Circuit recently clarified that the four § 101 categories con-
tinue to define the limits of patentable subject matter and 
should not be collapsed into a utility test.151 
Creative algorithms, for the purposes of § 101’s four posi-
tive categories, are indistinguishable from conventional soft-
ware algorithms. Software algorithms, as discussed above, need 
not produce any physical transformation to be patentable 
processes.152 Creative algorithms remain, at their core, soft-
ware algorithms and are likely satisfy the § 101 definition of a 
process.153 Furthermore, in light of the Federal Circuit’s deci-
sion in In re Alappat, creative algorithms claimed as computer-
implemented processes154 likely qualify as statutory ma-
chines.155 Under current law, algorithms with creative capacity 
 
 149. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1372 (“The plain and unambiguous meaning 
of § 101 is that any invention falling within one of the four stated categories of 
statutory subject matter may be patented . . . .”). Indeed, State Street appears 
to restore a “process” under § 101 to its full literal scope, undoing Gottschalk v. 
Benson’s exclusion of subject matter that was technically a “process.” See 409 
U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (denying that a process for converting one form of a number 
into another form was a “process” under § 101). 
 150. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 (“The question of whether a claim encom-
passes statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four catego-
ries of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter—but rather on the essential characteristics of the 
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.” (footnote omitted)). 
 151. See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e do 
not consider [State Street] as holding that the four statutory categories are 
rendered irrelevant, non-limiting, or subsumed into an overarching question 
about patentable utility.”). 
 152. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1358 (noting that a physical transforma-
tion is merely “one example of how a mathematical algorithm may bring about 
a useful application”). 
 153. A patentable “process” is “‘an act, or a series of acts, performed upon 
the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or 
thing.’” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (quoting Cochrane v. 
Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1876)). 
 154. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 (filed Jan. 5, 1999) (claiming a ge-
netic algorithm as such). 
 155. See 33 F.3d 1526, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Although the Federal Circuit 
later recognized that claiming software as a “machine” was not necessary, it 
certainly remains sufficient. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1358−59. 
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likely qualify under § 101 as a process, if claimed alone, or as a 
machine, if claimed in conjunction with a computer. 
If a patent attorney drafts claims covering creative algo-
rithms just as she drafts conventional software patent claims, 
the inventive processes creative algorithms are likely patenta-
ble under both common and statutory law. Unless the subject-
matter doctrine can be cured of its current impotence, patent 
law will continue to slide towards a detrimental conflation of 
inventor and invention. 
III.  STEELING THE GATEKEEPER:  
IDENTIFYING WORKABLE BOUNDARIES FOR 
PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER UNDER § 101   
Algorithms enabling artificial creativity are illustrative of 
the types of boundary-blurring,156 abstract inventions that will 
continue to challenge the key assumption underlying patent 
law theory—that patenting a particular invention will have the 
net effect of stimulating, rather than chilling, further inven-
tion. Patent law must recognize and enforce an interpretation 
of § 101 supporting this assumption. Because a creative 
process157 is inherently broad and unbounded, a patent cover-
ing such a process is inconsistent with this assumption. Section 
101 is fully capable of separating such abstract processes from 
those that are consistent with the goal of stimulating invention, 
but only if courts change how they apply it. First, common law 
subject-matter doctrine must be independently rooted in a sin-
gle theoretical basis. Second, statutory categories must exclude 
from “processes” or “machines” those inventions whose use ge-
nerates inherently unpredictable products. 
 
 156. The Supreme Court adheres to the mantra that “anything under the 
sun made by man” is patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). This phrase misfocuses the patentability 
inquiry on who made the invention rather than on the nature of the invention 
itself. By assuming that the inventive process ends once something is “made 
by man,” the Court ignores the possibility that man could create an invention 
that itself is capable of creative invention. 
 157. This Note does not directly address the issue of whether the products 
of creative algorithms should be patentable. For discussion of a related issue, 
copyright protection for computer-generated creative works, see generally Ar-
thur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 977, 1042−72 (1993); Samuelson, supra note 32, at 1142−53. 
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A. COMMON LAW DOCTRINE: FOCUSING ON ACCESS TO BASIC 
SCIENTIFIC TOOLS 
Both Supreme Court precedent158 and pragmatic concerns 
demand that subject matter patentability remain a robust, in-
dependent hurdle. By essentially equating subject-matter doc-
trine with the utility test, State Street renders it largely incon-
sequential. Several mechanisms for narrowing the scope of 
State Street, as it applies to patentable subject matter general-
ly, have been suggested.159 The two reconceptualizations sug-
gested here, however, are specifically tailored to restore to the 
common law categories their proper independent force. The 
common law categories can be resurrected by first, recognizing 
their independence from explicit statutory categories under 
§ 101 and second, applying them solely as means to preserve 
access to the basic tools of science, rather than ends them-
selves. 
1. Common Law Unpatentability: Independent of Statutory 
Patentability 
The Supreme Court has consistently but needlessly con-
flated two distinct concepts—the inclusive statutory definition 
of patentable subject matter and the exclusive common law de-
finition.160 Clearly, subject matter not a § 101 process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter cannot be patented. 
There is no need, however, to merge the exclusive common law 
doctrine into the definition of these terms.161 By maintaining 
 
 158. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (“The obligation to 
determine what type of discovery is sought to be patented must precede the 
determination of whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 4, at 1143 (suggesting that patentability 
can be limited to the technological arts by requiring subject matter to have an 
“industrial application” and by restricting patentable inventions to “repeatable 
production or transformation of material objects”). 
 160. See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589−90, 595 (reasoning that the formula 
for computing an alarm limit was a natural law, therefore it was already 
known, and therefore the claimed invention was not a statutory “process”); 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64, 68 (1972) (stating first that “[t]he ques-
tion is whether the method described and claimed is a ‘process’ within the 
meaning of the Patent Act,” and proceeding to determine that it was not be-
cause the algorithm for converting a binary coded decimal to a pure binary 
number was merely an abstract concept). 
 161. Certainly, common law cannot override statute. Because the language 
of § 101 states unequivocally that any “process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter” is patentable subject matter, in the strictest sense, an 
unpatentable abstract idea, natural law, or natural phenomena cannot be a 
§ 101 “process.” See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Law exists as applied theory, how-
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common law unpatentability as an independent and external 
doctrine, courts would obviate the need to artificially limit defi-
nitions of positive § 101 categories.162 Judges could then focus, 
clear-headed, on two separate inquiries. First, the exclusive 
analysis—whether common law disqualifies the subject matter 
as an abstract idea, law of nature or natural phenomena. If not, 
then the inclusive analysis—whether the subject matter quali-
fies under § 101 as a “process, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter.” By conducting two independent analyses, 
courts would avoid the conceptual mess inherent in efforts to 
define “processes” so as to exclude abstract ideas, laws of na-
ture, and natural phenomena. 
2. The Common Law Categories: Means To Protect the Basic 
Tools of Science and Nothing More 
Imprecision and “lawyerly word games”163 have consistent-
ly handicapped courts’ analyses of patentable subject matter 
under the common law. State Street understood the law govern-
ing patentable subject matter simply as an extra mechanism to 
ensure the invention was useful. Decisions preceding State 
Street cited various alternative justifications, including lack of 
novelty because the subject matter was inherent in nature,164 
the need to keep basic scientific tools accessible,165 and in a 
brief fit of circular reasoning, the categories themselves.166 To 
 
ever, and it makes little sense to analyze whether a claimed set of steps for 
converting light and carbon dioxide into sugar through photosynthesis is a 
“process” only to find it is not because it is a natural phenomena. Instead, for 
the sake of analytical clarity, courts should find photosynthesis unpatentable 
because it is a natural phenomenon, thereby reserving analysis of whether 
claimed steps are a “process” for subject matter that is not clearly an abstract 
idea, law of nature, or natural phenomena. 
 162. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 64−65, 68, 70 (defining a patentable 
process as the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a different state 
or thing’” and then proceeding to determine that “programs to solve mathe-
matical problems of converting one form of numerical representation to anoth-
er” are not such “processes”). 
 163. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 403. 
 164. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948) (finding a mixture of nitrogen-fixing bacteria unpatentable because the 
bacteria were claimed in their natural state—nothing was invented); O’Reilly 
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61, 132 (1854) (“The mere discovery of a new ele-
ment, or law, or principle of nature without any valuable application of it to 
the arts, is not the subject of a patent.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
 166. See, e.g., Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175 (1852) (“[A] 
principle is not patentable. A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental 
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can 
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be effective, the doctrine must be focused. Common law limits 
on patentability can effectively screen out inventors and inven-
tive processes only when courts apply “laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas”167 as nothing more than ana-
lytical means to achieve a single and specific end: maintaining 
public access to the basic tools of science. 
The Constitution explicitly states that patent law exists to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”168 A common 
law inquiry focused on maintaining access to scientific tools di-
rectly reflects this purpose. It also forces subject matter paten-
tability doctrine to reflect patent law’s broad grounding in utili-
tarianism—freely available scientific tools promote and 
encourage “useful and beneficial innovation”169 by reducing the 
costs of research.170 Focusing analyses on the extent to which 
patents increase the cost of using basic scientific tools compels 
courts to confront squarely the risk of fostering an anticom-
mons.171 
Because most inventions can be used for scientific purpos-
es, determining which inventions qualify as “basic tools of 
scientific research” requires striking a delicate balance between 
access and incentive. Courts and policymakers, then, must de-
termine which tools are sufficiently basic to justify denying the 
patent privilege.172 To achieve this end, courts must use the 
 
claim in either of them an exclusive right.”). 
 167. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 169. See Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting 
Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 435 (2003) (“The un-
derlying rationale of patent law is to serve the public good by creating legal 
protections to promote useful and beneficial innovation.”). 
 170. As discussed above, privatization of a resource necessary to enable fu-
ture invention (here “inventive processes”) raises the costs for others seeking 
to use that resource, thus chilling the innovation that depends on its use. See 
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 125, at 698. 
 171. See id. (noting that as more private parties acquire exclusionary 
rights in a resource, the risk that it will be underexploited increases). 
 172. But see SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated on reh'g en banc, 403 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005), 
superseded, 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that patentable subject 
matter and the scope of claims are unrelated); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (asserting 
that the scope of patent claims should be limited by §§ 102, 103, and 112, not 
by § 101). Section 101, however, addresses subject matter whose nature is 
such that any claim covering that subject matter would be impermissibly 
broad. That is, the inquiry focuses on the inherent scope of the subject matter 
claimed, rather than the scope of the specific claim language. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (2000). 
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conceptual categories of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and 
natural phenomena as lenses through which to focus analyses. 
Because each of these categories comprises subject matter 
essential to continuing research and development,173 a claimed 
invention falling wholly within any category or any combina-
tion of the three is definitively unpatentable. The categories are 
merely analytical means, however, and as such they do not de-
fine the full reach of the common law exclusions. Subject mat-
ter not explicitly within the three categories but closely analog-
ous and implicating similar concerns may yet be sufficiently 
basic for the common law to render it unpatentable. Thus, ab-
stract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are suffi-
cient, though not necessarily exclusive, components of the 
common law inquiry.174 By using the common law categories as 
means to identify and deny patent protection to basic scientific 
tools, courts can give common law patentability doctrine suffi-
cient independent vitality to confront artificial creativity and 
other similarly broad abstract inventions. 
Grounding common law unpatentability in other patent 
law doctrines such as utility and novelty is problematic. State 
Street’s “useful, concrete and tangible result” test ignores the 
very real possibility of highly useful yet preferably unpatenta-
ble inventions. Nonnovelty, or preemption by nature’s “prior 
art,”175 is similarly deficient in at least three ways.176 
First, a common law doctrine grounded in nonnovelty 
renders subject matter unpatentable only when it is discovered 
rather than created. Although abstract ideas such as mathe-
matical algorithms model the logic of the universe with impres-
 
 173. See supra notes 64−65 and accompanying text. 
 174. Other suggested mechanisms provide useful complements in the diffi-
cult task of identifying sufficiently “basic” scientific tools. See, e.g., Yun-
hyoung Lee, supra note 65, at 82 (discussing “upstream” versus “downstream” 
research tools); cf. Rai, supra note 114, at 138−40 (proposing various strate-
gies for using the law to reinforce scientific research norms that support main-
taining a large public domain of biotechnology research tools). Other policy 
discussions center on, for instance, whether the “scientific model of research” 
or the “market model of innovation” is superior. See Kahn, supra note 169, at 
438−39. 
 175. Burk and Lemley suggest an “inherency” doctrine that renders unpa-
tentable unchanged natural products. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 
408. This formulation, however, is ill-suited to limit creative algorithms. 
 176. But see Burtis, supra note 22, at 1157 (emphasizing the importance of 
distinguishing between that which is discovered and invented to accurately 
interpret § 101, and noting courts’ continued difficulty in recognizing the dis-
tinction). 
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sive success, they may in fact be merely useful human con-
structs.177 The same may be said of natural laws, such as the 
theory of natural selection. The definition of “basic scientific 
tools,” on the other hand, does not depend on whether the tools 
are “created or discovered”—they may be both. Second, all in-
ventions are to some degree a “manifestation of natural mate-
rials and natural laws.”178 It is exceedingly difficult to delineate 
precisely how much human manipulation is necessary before 
the invention is sufficiently artificial, a fact the Supreme Court 
has recognized.179 Although determining whether certain tools 
of science are sufficiently basic also requires significant judg-
ment, courts can support such judgments with empirical da-
ta.180 Third, the nature of human thought is incredibly complex. 
Even if creative algorithms appear to share many parallels 
with natural laws governing human logic and creativity, neu-
roscientists have not yet uncovered the precise mechanisms 
that govern the mind.181 Common law doctrine is most effec-
tive, then, when the inquiry focuses solely on the extent to 
which claimed subject matter would monopolize basic scientific 
tools. 
3. Applying the Common Law Categories: An Inventive 
Process Is a Basic Tool of Science 
Creative algorithms potentially propertize basic scientific 
tools on two levels—as mathematical algorithms and as inven-
tive processes. Determining the extent to which claims covering 
mathematical algorithms preclude others from using them, 
however, is a task that has consistently confounded courts.182 
 
 177. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 408; Samuelson, supra note 32, 
at 1097 n.274 (“It quite obviously makes no sense to make the patentability of 
mathematical formulae turn on whether they are ‘invented’ or ‘discovered,’ for 
it is impossible to know for certain which is the case.”). 
 178. Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 406−07. 
 179. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981) (cautioning 
against a reductionist argument which would “if carried to its extreme, make 
all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underly-
ing principles of nature which, once known, make their implementation ob-
vious”). 
 180. For instance, courts could cite economic data showing the projected 
cost of licensing a tool should it become patented or statistical data showing 
current or projected usage rates of the tool at issue in a particular research 
field. 
 181. But see Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The Models 
Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1986) (“[H]umans think by means 
of algorithms. Sequences of mental steps and algorithms are the same thing.”). 
 182. Compare Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) (finding that 
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The only plausible line that may be drawn is the one that 
courts have adhered to: an unapplied, “disembodied mathemat-
ical concept” remains unpatentable.183 Once algorithms are put 
to use as computer software, delineating between those that 
propertize basic tools of science and those that do not becomes 
much more difficult.184 The component algorithms of creative 
processes such as genetic algorithms, viewed in isolation, differ 
little from those of traditional software.185 Thus, it is similarly 
futile to analyze the patentability of creative processes in terms 
of their component algorithms. Creative algorithms emerge as 
fundamentally different only when one takes a step back and 
analyzes them in terms of the functionality they enable—
artificial creativity. 
Unlike mathematical algorithms, inventive processes do 
not fit neatly into any of the three common law categories—
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. As dis-
cussed above, however, the common law categories are best ap-
plied only as means to identify the basic tools of science. An in-
ventive process is broadly abstract. Although the final 
invention is often quite concrete, the inventive process requires 
a freeform, unpredictable combination of logic and creativity. 
Furthermore, inventive processes do not merely apply existing 
scientific knowledge186—they also create new basic knowledge. 
A genetic algorithm, for instance, may evolve a unique combi-
nation of circuit components previously thought to be unworka-
 
the claimed mathematical algorithm had only the claimed use, and thus “the 
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula”), with AT&T Corp. 
v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (explain-
ing that applying a mathematical algorithm “in a practical manner to produce 
a useful result” is sufficient to show that the patent applicant has not “at-
tempt[ed] to forestall its use in any other application”). 
 183. See AT&T Corp., 172 F.3d at 1357. For instance, the Pythagorean 
Theorem, a2 + b2 = c2, is by itself unpatentable. 
 184. The “mathematical algorithm” exception was at least in part based on 
the idea that pure mathematical algorithms are abstract ideas, and the Su-
preme Court has not held a patent invalid because it claimed an “abstract con-
cept” since O’Reilly v. Morse. See 56 U.S. (15 How.) 61, 112−21 (1853); see also 
Burk & Lemley, supra note 67, at 403−04. 
 185. See KOZA ET AL., supra note 2, at 77 (“The computer programs in-
volved in genetic programming may be single-branch programs . . . or multi-
branch programs (containing one or more result-producing branches, automat-
ically defined functions, automatically defined iterations, automatically 
defined loops, automatically defined recursions, or automatically defined 
stores).”). 
 186. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1740 (2007) (holding 
that a patentable invention cannot result from a process that merely requires 
a person of ordinary skill in the art to “implement a predictable variation”). 
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ble, generating new knowledge about circuit component inte-
raction. Indeed, it is impossible to completely separate basic 
scientific knowledge from applied research.187 Finally, even if 
one considers a creative algorithm itself an invention, users can 
apply the algorithm to solve any number of practical prob-
lems.188 An inventive process is not applied knowledge in the 
sense of being limited to a particular practical problem. 
Thus, inventive processes are both closely analogous to ab-
stract ideas and necessary to continued scientific discovery. In-
ventive processes must themselves be considered one of the ba-
sic tools essential to everyday science. Without them, the cycle 
of technological innovation would grind to a halt. 
B. STATUTORY PROCESSES AND MACHINES: DEMANDING 
PREDICTABLE PRODUCTS 
Like the common law doctrine, the statutory subject-
matter doctrine can be strengthened by recognizing and mak-
ing explicit what it assumes—that the invention cannot be the 
inventor. In so limiting the universe of patentable subject mat-
ter, § 101 implies that patentable inventions, when later used, 
predictably produce replicable results. 
Section 101 contains two necessarily separate clauses. The 
first, “[w]hoever invents or discovers,” describes the actor and 
the action, while the second, “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter,” describes the ob-
jects of the action.189 Only the objects of the action, however, 
are entitled to patent protection. Explicitly recognizing that 
which distinguishes inventing from invention provides a useful 
mechanism for limiting patentable subject matter to the objects 
of § 101. In a narrow sense, every process is creative because it 
creates something useful. But if it produces only the expected, 
predicted result, it is not truly inventive.190 A genuinely inven-
tive process contains a spark of creativity that pushes the 
process in directions unpredictable at the outset. If unpredicta-
bility distinguishes the inventive process, then the beginning of 
 
 187. See Oskar Liivak, Maintaining Competition in Copying: Narrowing 
the Scope of Gene Patents, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 177, 179 (2007); cf. Lee, supra 
note 118, at 663 n.10 (noting that the line between basic and applied research 
is increasingly blurry). 
 188. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 claim 1 (filed Jan. 5, 1999) (claim-
ing “[a]n iterative computer-implemented process for creating a structural de-
sign that satisfies prespecified design goals”). 
 189. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 190. See KSR Int’l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1740. 
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predictability must determine when an invention finally 
emerges. 
To discern whether a purported invention is in fact an un-
patentably abstract process, courts must analyze whether the 
claimed subject matter can be predictably used to achieve rep-
licable results. For example, courts have defined a process as 
“‘an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter 
to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.’”191 
This definition implies, however, that every time the prescribed 
act or series of acts are performed on the same subject matter, 
they will transform and reduce that subject matter to the same 
different state or thing. Using the process must achieve pre-
dictable and replicable results. If it did not, then the user would 
be experimenting or inventing, not using. Like a pure mathe-
matical algorithm, the claimed process would have multiple in-
determinate uses.192 
A brief analysis of a genetic algorithm under this frame-
work shows the vitality of statutory subject matter correctly 
understood. Take, for example, a genetic algorithm claimed as 
“[a]n iterative computer-implemented process for creating a 
structural design that satisfies prespecified design goals.”193 
This claim likely qualifies as either a process or machine194 un-
der present statutory subject-matter doctrine. To apply the full 
force of § 101, a court must take the analysis one step further. 
It must determine whether the claimed algorithm can be pre-
dictably used to achieve replicable results. Assume now that 
the claimed genetic algorithm is used to create the structural 
design of a roof truss, capable of supporting a load of 1000 lbs 
and weighing no more than 100 lbs. On the surface, the results 
are both predictable and replicable: every time the algorithm is 
run with these design goals, it outputs a design that meets 
them. If the algorithm is run ten times, however, it will yield 
ten different roof truss designs. Each design meets or exceeds 
the preset criteria,195 but the roof truss has been transformed 
 
 191. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gott-
schalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). 
 192. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71. 
 193. This language is taken directly from a granted patent. See Method 
and Apparatus for Automated Design of Complex Structures Using Genetic 
Programming, U.S. Patent No. 6,360,191 claim 1 (filed Jan. 5, 1999). 
 194. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (recognizing the 
validity of “machine” claims consisting of software and a general purpose com-
puter). 
 195. For instance, the first design may support 1010.3 lb. and weigh 98.2 
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into a different “different state or thing”196 every time. Patent 
law identifies a specific invention by its structure, not its func-
tion. Inventors may claim a function without specifying a cor-
responding structure when using “means-plus-function” claims, 
but such claims are limited to the specific structure described 
in the patent’s specification.197 Because a genetic algorithm in-
volves random mutation, a user cannot predict the specific 
truss structure the algorithm will yield even when given iden-
tical initial inputs. Thus, a genetic algorithm cannot be a § 101 
process. 
This interpretation of subject matter patentability doc-
trine, with common law doctrine protecting basic research tools 
and statutory language requiring predictable and replicable 
use, offers several advantages. Dissenting in Diamond v. Diehr, 
Justice Stevens criticizes case law analyzing the patentability 
of software for failing to “establish rules that enable a conscien-
tious patent lawyer to determine . . . which, if any, program-
related inventions will be patentable.”198 State Street estab-
lished a clear rule but at the cost of an independent subject 
matter test. This solution strikes a better balance, maintaining 
a viable subject-matter doctrine while providing patent attor-
neys with a relatively concrete framework from which to pre-
dict patentability.199 Furthermore, this solution does not chill 
“intangible” invention generally.200 Rather, it maintains the pa-
tentability of the majority of software currently being devel-
oped and recognizes that “many important advances . . . involve 
intangible information-processing steps.”201 More importantly, 
however, a strong subject matter patentability doctrine accom-
 
lb., while the second design supports 1006.8 lb. and weighs 99.4 lb. 
 196. See Benson, 409 U.S. at 70 (defining a statutory “process”). 
 197. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000) (“[S]uch claim shall be construed to 
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifica-
tion and equivalents thereof.”). 
 198. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 199. The inability to establish a cohesive, predictable regime governing pa-
tentable subject matter has been a longstanding weakness of patent law, par-
ticularly in the area of software patents. See Burtis, supra note 22, at 1129 
(“Courts continue to struggle to develop a doctrine of patentable subject mat-
ter that is at once stable enough to provide predictability to the marketplace, 
which makes decisions based on the legal protection available to technology, 
while maintaining sufficient flexibility to keep abreast of ever-changing tech-
nological advancement.”). 
 200. See Gruner, supra note 22, at 467 (arguing that patent standards 
should be altered to accommodate information-processing advances and to en-
courage intangible inventions). 
 201. Id. at 360. 
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plishes what a heightened utility requirement202 cannot. It ex-
cludes from patentability subject matter that is highly useful 
but nonetheless ill-suited for the protection of a patent monopo-
ly. In doing so, however, it maintains a strong subject matter 
patentability test anchored entirely in the utilitarian principle 
that supports American patent law. There is no need to import 
amorphous moral philosophies, such as the European concept 
of “ordre public.”203 Finally, and most importantly, application 
of the subject-matter doctrine as constructed above is not li-
mited to creative algorithms. By focusing the common law on 
protecting basic tools of research and the statutory test on en-
suring inventions that can be predictably used, subject-matter 
doctrine can continue to effectively confront new and increa-
singly abstract technologies as they emerge. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have consistently struggled to determine whether 
new fields of invention deserve patent protection. Computer 
software, in particular, has generated contorted, conflicting, 
and overlapping analyses, leaving the doctrine of subject mat-
ter patentability constantly in flux. By essentially merging the 
subject matter test into a utility inquiry, the Federal Circuit 
appeared to have at least settled on a comprehensible and 
workable approach. Now, two developments—emerging soft-
ware technology enabling autonomous, creative invention and 
recent Federal Circuit decisions reasserting the independence 
of the subject matter test—demand a revised approach to ana-
lyzing the patentability of abstract inventions. 
Under existing patent law, the common law is incapable of 
independently excluding any new invention, while statutory 
subject-matter doctrine cannot adequately distinguish between 
 
 202. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology, Policy, and Patenta-
bility: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 
101, 112 (2001) (suggesting that, in the context of biotechnology, “the Patent 
and Trademark Office (‘PTO’) and courts should use the utility requirement to 
impose real, albeit not insurmountable, obstacles” in order to limit what is pa-
tented). 
 203. See, e.g., Katrina McClatchey, The European Patent Office and the Eu-
ropean Patent: An Open Avenue for Biotechnologists and “Living Inventions”, 2 
OKLA. J.L. & TECH. 25, 8 (2004), http://www.okjolt.info/pdf/2004okjoltrev25.pdf 
(describing the “ordre public” concept: “‘[i]nventions, the exploitation of which 
is not in conformity with the conventionally accepted standards of conduct 
pertaining to the culture inherent in European society and civilization are to 
be excluded from patentability as being contrary to morality’” (citation omit-
ted)). 
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inventor and invention. The solution proposed by this Note 
gives subject-matter doctrine the renewed relevance necessary 
to confront broadly abstract inventions such as artificial crea-
tive processes by addressing each problem separately. First, 
courts must apply common law categories of unpatentable sub-
ject matter solely as means to identify basic tools of scientific 
research and ensure they remain freely available. Second, 
courts must construe § 101 processes and machines to include 
only those that yield predictable results when used. So unders-
tood, subject-matter doctrine can and will continue to serve its 
necessary role in limiting the patent privilege. 
